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KIRSCH V. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS: 1 WILL THE SUPREME COURT SAY 
“HANDS OFF” AGAIN? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“There’s a grey stone chapel here at Folsom; a house of worship in 
this den of sin.  You wouldn’t think that God had a place here at Folsom, 
but He’s saved the soul of many lost men.”2  Does religion have a place 
at the Folsoms of America?  If so, who decides how much of a place 
religion can have in these prisons? 
Some prison administrators welcome religion within the walls of 
the prison.3  One Wisconsin Prison Security Director believes that 
religion even performs a legitimate security role in the prison.4 On the 
other hand, some prison officials limit the practice of religion in prison 
for the sake of security.5 
This Note examines the struggle of prison inmates to gain access to 
religious materials; materials that have been forbidden by prison 
officials.  Part II of the Note will examine the historical development of 
inmates’ constitutional rights.6  It will also analyze the Supreme Court’s 
standard for reviewing prison regulations involving inmates’ 
                                                          
 1. Kirsch v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 238 Wis. 2d 94, 617 N.W.2d 677 (table, full 
text in WESTLAW), 2000 WL 730379, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. June 8, 2000). 
 2. JOHNNY CASH, Greystone Chapel, on AT FOLSOM PRISON AND SAN QUENTIN (Columbia 
Records). 
 3. Andy Hall, Does Religion Reform Inmates?; Some Prisoners Say Religion Helps Them 
Turn Around, But Research is Spotty and Inconclusive, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 28, 1999, at 1A.  The 
author points to a South Carolina study that found that inmates who participated in Prison 
Fellowship Ministries were less than half as likely as other inmates to misbehave while incarcerated.  
Id.  However, there have been relatively few studies examining the effectiveness of these prison 
chaplain programs.  Id. 
 4. Id. at 1A.  The security director stated that the religion program comforts inmates and 
provides an outlet for tension.  Id.  The chaplain program accounts for one-fourth of one percent of 
the Department of Corrections’ current operating budget.  Id. 
 5. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.  
The Court said that maintaining institutional security and preserving internal discipline are essential 
goals that may require limitation of an inmate’s Free Exercise rights.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. 
 6. See infra Part II. A. 
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constitutional rights.7 Moreover, the Note discusses Congress’ attempt to 
set the standard of review.8  The Note then examines the significance of 
the Kirsch decision.9  Finally, the Note analyzes the fourth factor of the 
Turner Standard used in Kirsch and explores the possible effect of a new 
legislative act on prisoners’ Free Exercise claims.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  History of Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights 
When do the reasons for limiting religion in prison outweigh an 
inmate’s constitutional right of Free Exercise?11  What test should be 
used to determine that question?  Historically, prisoners’ rights were 
extremely limited and the courts adhered to a hands-off doctrine.12 The 
courts chose to defer to the prison administrations’ decisions concerning 
regulations that burdened the Free Exercise of religion.13 As a result of 
the hands-off doctrine, potentially worthy complaints were not given 
meaningful review and prison officials had little incentive to improve 
prison conditions.14 
                                                          
 7. See infra Part II. B. 
 8. See infra Part II. C. 
 9. See infra Part III and Part IV. A. 
 10. See infra Part IV. B and Part IV. C. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment contains the Free Exercise Clause: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 12. See generally, e.g., Lorijean Golichowski Dei, Note, The New Standard of Review for 
Prisoners’ Rights: A ‘Turner’ for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 399 (1988) (outlining the 
development of case law dealing with prisoners rights and describing the hands-off doctrine used by 
the courts).  The hands-off doctrine described the courts’ absolute deference to prison officials that 
continued until the 1960’s.  Id.  Prisoners were generally not even permitted to engage in religious 
activities.  Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again?  Legislative 
Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2334 (1998) (describing the 
background and development of Free Exercise for religious prisoners).  In Kelly v. Dowd, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared that when a state prison refuses to provide religious 
materials to an inmate, the reasonableness of that refusal may only be determined by state courts.  
140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1944). 
 13. Braunstein, supra note 12, at 2334.  The key rationales offered to support the hands-off 
approach were: the perceived propriety of deferring to the prison officials’ expertise; and federalism 
issues that could arise if federal courts intervened in controversies between state prisoners and state 
prisons.  Roberta M. Harding, In the Belly of the Beast: A Comparison of the Evolution and Status 
of Prisoners’ Rights in the United States and Eurupe, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9-10 (1998). 
 14. Sara Anderson Frey, Religion Behind Bars: Prison Litigation Under the Religious 
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court began to scrutinize some police 
conduct, which led to the gradual erosion of the hands-off doctrine.15  In 
Cruz v. Beto, the Supreme Court extended the right of Free Exercise to 
the incarcerated.16  In Pell v. Pecunier, the Supreme Court set forth a 
general standard for prisoners’ First Amendment claims, which balanced 
the prisoners’ constitutional rights against the prisons’ interests.17  The 
Court held that, as long as the prisoners had reasonable alternative 
                                                          
Freedom Restoration Act in the Wake of Mack v. O’Leary, 101 DICK. L. REV. 753, 757 (1997) 
(describing the consequences of the hands-off doctrine). 
 15. Dei, supra note 12, at 401.  The Court began tackling issues in which police conduct 
infringed upon the rights of accused individuals.  Id.  The Court began addressing criminal 
defendants’ Fourth Amendment right to exclusion of evidence obtained in an unlawful search and 
seizure, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.  Id. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (finding that confessions 
obtained in violation of fifth amendment procedural safeguards are inadmissible at trial); Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964) (holding that confessions obtained after criminal suspect 
requested but was refused assistance of counsel were in violation of sixth amendment right and 
therefore inadmissible); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (requiring that state courts exclude 
evidence obtained by unlawful searches and seizures). 
  These decisions led to the gradual erosion of the hands-off doctrine and allowed the Court 
to extend its jurisdiction to the issue of prisoners’ Free Exercise rights.  Dei, supra note 12, at 401.  
“When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts 
will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-
06 (1974).  In Martinez, prisoners challenged mail censorship regulations that limited 
correspondence between inmates and persons outside the prison.  Id. at 398-400.  The Court held 
that the regulation was justified if it furthered an important or substantial governmental interest and 
the infringement on free speech was no greater than necessary.  Id. at 413-14.  Under that level of 
scrutiny, the Court found that the regulations did not further the substantial governmental interest.  
Id. at 415 (holding that the warden could not show how permitting inmates to send mail would lead 
to riots). 
 16. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Cruz involved a Buddhist prisoner who claimed 
that he was not allowed to pray in the prison chapel, consult with religious advisors, or share 
religious materials with other inmates.  Id. at 319.  The Court held that the restrictions denied the 
prisoner a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded 
fellow prisoners.  Id. at 322.  Thus, the Court held that Texas had violated the inmate’s First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id.  The Court signaled the end of the hands-off doctrine when it 
said that while it is not the duty of the federal courts to supervise prisons, it is the duty of the court 
to enforce the constitutional rights of all persons, including prisoners.  Id. at 321.  However, in his 
dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Framers would be surprised to know that prisoners have 
been included in the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 325-326 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of prison officials). 
 17. Pell v. Pecunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).  Pell involved a prison regulation that prohibited 
some inmates from interviewing with the media. Id.  The regulation was enacted after a violent 
prison episode that the correction authorities attributed at least in part to the former policy of free 
face-to-face prisoner-press interviews.  Id.  These interviews had resulted in a small number of 
inmates gaining disproportionate notoriety and influence among the other inmates.  Id. The Court 
balanced the prisoners’ constitutional rights against the interests of the prison administration in 
maintaining security. Id. at 822-828. In doing so, the Court stressed that deference must be afforded 
to the prison administration’s interests in determining whether the regulation is valid.  Id. at 827. 
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means for exercising their rights, the regulation would be deemed 
valid.18 
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court applied a deferential standard 
of scrutiny in deciding whether a prison regulation violates First 
Amendment rights.19  The Court applied a rational relationship standard 
and concluded that the regulation did not violate the First Amendment 
rights of the inmates.20  The Court reasoned that the prison regulation 
was “a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security 
problem.”21  Once again, the Court strongly deferred to the decision-
making of the prison administration.22 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Standard 
The Supreme Court did not set forth a bright line standard to 
determine prisoners’ Free Exercise claims23 until it decided Turner v. 
Safley in 1987.24  In Turner, the Court announced the standard that must 
be used in determining the validity of constitutionally challenged prison 
regulations.25  First, the Court reiterated that “prison walls do not form a 
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”26  The Court articulated the following standard: “[w]hen a 
                                                          
 18. Id.  (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321).  The Court, in Pell, held that the inmates had 
alternative means of communication such as mail correspondence.  Id. 
 19. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  One of the challenged prison regulations in Bell 
prohibited inmates from receiving hard cover books unless the books were mailed directly by the 
publishers or bookclubs.  Id. at 528. 
 20. Id. at 550. 
 21. Id. at 550.  The “obvious” security problems that the Court referred to included possible 
drug and weapon smuggling into the prison.  Id. at 550-551. 
 22. Id. at 547-48.  “Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional 
expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate 
that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily 
defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”  Pell, 417 U.S. at 827.  The Court said that problems 
that arise day-to-day in a correctional facility are not susceptible to easy solutions.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 
548.  Therefore, the Court determined that prison officials should be accorded a wide-ranging 
deference in the adoption and execution of prison policy.  Id.  The Court also believed that this 
deference was necessary in order to avoid allowing the judicial branch to violate the separation of 
powers by attempting to run the prisons.  Id. 
 23. Braunstein, supra note 12, at 2349. 
 24. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  Turner involved two prison regulations: 1) a 
restriction that denied inmate-to-inmate correspondence and 2) a restriction that prohibited inmates 
from marrying unless the prison superintendent determined that there were compelling reasons for 
the marriage.  Id. at 81. 
 25. Id. at 89. 
 26. Id. at 84. Because prisoners retain these constitutional rights, “[w]hen a prison regulation 
or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty 
to protect constitutional rights.” Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 
4
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prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”27 
Thereafter, the Court established four factors to determine whether 
a regulation is reasonable.28  The first factor requires that a “valid, 
rational connection” exist between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest advanced to justify it.29  The second 
factor considers whether there are alternative means available to inmates 
that would allow them to exercise their religious beliefs.30  The third 
factor considers the impact that an accommodation of the asserted right 
will have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of resources.31  
Finally, the fourth factor examines whether inmates can point to an easy 
and obvious alternative that fully accommodates their rights at de 
minimis cost to penological interests.32  The Court made it clear that the 
                                                          
(1974)). 
 27. Id. at 89. 
 28. Id. at 89-91. 
 29. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).  The regulation is deemed 
valid as long as it is neutral and not “arbitrary or irrational.”  Id. at 89-90.  The Turner Court found 
that the marriage regulation was not logically related to legitimate security concerns.  Id. at 97.  
Prison officials argued that they instituted the marriage regulation for the security purpose of 
preventing  “love triangles” that could lead to violence.  Id.  Even with the leniency of this first 
factor, the Court still found that there was no logical connection between the marriage restriction 
and the formation of love triangles.  Id. at 98 (reasoning that such love triangles could just as easily 
develop without a formal marriage ceremony). 
  On the other hand, the Court found that the correspondence regulation was reasonably 
related to a legitimate security concern.  Id. at 93.  The Court found the regulation to be content 
neutral and a logical advancement of the institutional goals of security and safety.  Id.  But see 
William Mark Roth, Turner v. Safley: The Supreme Court Further Confuses Prisoners’ 
Constitutional Rights, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 667, 688 (1989) (contending that the arguments that 
the regulation advanced safety and security goals were based on very speculative evidence). 
 30. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  Once again, the Court asserts that if there are alternative means 
for the prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights, then courts should be “particularly conscious 
of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials.’”  Id. at 90 (quoting Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).  In Turner,  the Court found that there were alternative means 
available for the prisoners to exercise their First Amendment rights.  Id. at 92.  However, this test is 
relatively easy for prison administrations to pass.  When a court defines the constitutional right 
broadly, such as the Turner Court did when it said that the first amendment encompassed “all means 
of expression,” then the regulation will only bar one small part of the total right.  Roth, supra note 
29, at 688-89.  Therefore, barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence is a valid regulation, because 
the prisoners still have other means of expression available.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 92. 
 31. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  The Court found that the regulation satisfied the third factor 
based on the testimony of prison officials.  Id. at 92.  Rather than require specific evidence showing 
that problems would arise at the prison, the Court chose to defer to the expertise of the prison 
officials.  Id. 
 32. Id. at 91.  The Court further qualified this factor, with deference to prison officials, by 
stating that it was not a “least restrictive alternative” test.  Id. at 90.  The Court declared that prison 
officials shall not be required to “set up and then shoot down” every conceivable alternative method 
5
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new standard is a lesser standard than the strict scrutiny standard of 
review that some courts of appeal embraced prior to the Turner 
decision.33 
One week after the Turner decision, the Supreme Court applied the 
four factors in a case involving a prison regulation that prevented some 
inmates from attending religious services.34  The Court held that the 
regulation was valid, because it was reasonably related to the valid 
penological interest of maintaining security.35 
The Turner Standard required courts to give extreme deference to 
the prison administration.36  The Court went even further in Employment 
Division v. Smith, where the State of Oregon denied two Native 
Americans’ unemployment compensation after they were fired for 
ingesting peyote as part of a religious ceremony.37  The Smith Court held 
that Free Exercise rights are not violated when a state places burdens on 
religious practice, as long as the state law is facially neutral and 
generally applicable.38  As a result of Smith’s narrow reading of the Free 
                                                          
of accommodation.  Id.  In order to show that the regulation is an “exaggerated response” by prison 
officials, there must be an easy and obvious alternative to the regulation.  Id.  Inmates bear the 
burden of showing that an alternative fully accommodates their rights, while only imposing a de 
minimis cost to penological interests.  Id. at 91.  The majority deferred to the opinions of the prison 
officials and held that monitoring inmate mail would exact more than a de minimis cost to the 
prison.  Id. at 93 (holding that the burden placed on the staff would impose more than a de minimis 
cost). 
 33. Id. at 81. 
 34. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).  The regulation at issue prohibited 
prisoners, assigned to work outside, from returning to the prison during the day except for 
emergency purposes.  Id. at 347.  Therefore, Muslim prisoners assigned to work outside were 
prohibited from participating in religious services that occurred during the day.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 350-51. 
 36. Braunstein, supra note 23, at 2351.  The Turner Court explained this “due deference” by 
stating that running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, 
and the commitment of resources.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.  The Court went on to say that these 
responsibilities are peculiarly within the province of the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  Id. at 85. 
 37. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith involved two former 
employees of a private drug rehabilitation organization who were fired after ingesting peyote for 
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church.  Id. at 874.  Under Oregon 
law, it was criminal to ingest a controlled substance for any purpose.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) 
(1987).  Today, the State of Oregon recognizes, as an affirmative defense to the crime, the good 
faith practice of peyote ingestion for religious beliefs, Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(5) (1999).  The State 
of Oregon denied their applications for unemployment compensation, pursuant to a state law that 
disqualified employees discharged for work-related “misconduct.”  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.  The 
petitioners argued that this denial violated their First Amendment Free Exercise rights.  Id. 
 38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-90. The Court held that since the law was neutral and generally 
applicable-and not unconstitutional on other grounds- it was valid. Id. at 890.  The Court determined 
that the State did not ban the ingestion of peyote solely because of the religious motivation behind 
the act for some people.  Id. at 882.  The Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the 
6
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Exercise Clause, the Clause only protected religious exercises from non-
neutral laws that directly targeted or burdened those exercises.39 
C.  Congress’s Standard 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).40  Congress enacted the RFRA for the precise purposes of 
overruling both: 1) Smith’s narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause; 
and 2) Smith’s refusal to apply a strict scrutiny test in assessing the 
validity of a neutral governmental act that burdens religion.41  Congress’ 
power struggle with the Supreme Court over the Free Exercise Clause 
had begun. “[N]ever before, at least in the history of congressional 
consideration of Free Exercise matters, has Congress ever hurled such 
disrespectful and angry insults at the Supreme Court.”42 
Several courts found that the enactment of the RFRA rejected the 
Turner and O’Lone decisions as well.43  The RFRA prohibited any 
                                                          
obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids a religiously motivated act, when that law 
is also applied to those who engage in the same act for non-religious purposes.  Id. at 879. 
 39. Eugene Gressman, RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper Errors, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 507, 513 (1999). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994); See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the Supreme Court later held the RFRA to be unconstitutional). 
 41. See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 39, at 514 (arguing that the RFRA was a violation of 
separation of powers). 
 42. Id. at 514-515. Congress passed the RFRA, in direct response to Smith, with widespread 
bipartisan support and the approval of nearly all religious groups throughout the country. 
Braunstein, supra note 12, at 2356.  However, a proposed amendment to the RFRA bill would have 
excluded prisoners from its protection.  139 Cong. Rec. S14, 353 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).  
Proponents of the amendment to the bill feared: 1) that prisoners might use the RFRA for frivolous 
litigation; and 2) that the least restrictive means test might result in constant intrusion by the 
judiciary.  Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act’s Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV. 325, 335-37 (1995).  The Senate 
Committee concluded that the first amendment doctrine was sufficiently sensitive to the demands of 
prison management; therefore, a special exemption for prison Free Exercise claims was 
unwarranted.  S. REP. No. 103-111, pt. Vd (1993).  The amendment to the bill failed, so the 
protection extended to prisoners.  139 Cong. Rec. 514, 468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).  This extension 
was essential, because religious Free Exercise protections could possibly be more important for 
prisoners than for any other segment of society. Lee Boothby & Nicholas P. Miller, Prisoner Claims 
for Religious Freedom and State RFRAs, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573, 585 (1999) (arguing that 
government-imposed burdens on religion will occur more often and in greater degree for those 
subject to twenty-four hour control and detainment). 
 43. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).  The Tenth Circuit Court held 
that a prison system may not substantially burden a prisoner’s right of Free Exercise in the absence 
of a compelling state interest and must employ the least restrictive means necessary to further their 
interest.  Id. at 1479.  The court stated that the RFRA legislatively overturned Supreme Court 
decisions, including Turner and O’Lone.  Id.  Another court also found that the RFRA rejected the 
reasonableness standard of Turner in favor of a compelling interest test.  Campos v. Coughlin, 854 
F. Supp. 194, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  Campos dealt with a prison regulation that prohibited inmates 
7
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governmental action that “substantially burdened” the exercise of 
religion unless the action could be justified on the ground that it 
furthered a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive 
manner.44  As a majority of courts applied the compelling interest 
standard mandated by the Act, the RFRA generally produced positive 
results for prisoners.45 
On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court threw the next punch in this 
heated battle among the judiciary, the states, the legislature and the 
President.46  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down 
the RFRA as unconstitutional.47  In a six-to-three decision, the Court 
ruled that Congress, in enacting the RFRA, exceeded its Enforcement 
Power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 
“The far-reaching significance of the Court’s decision [in City of 
Boerne] is hard to exaggerate.”49  The cause of religious freedom, 
                                                          
from wearing Orisha beads in conformity with the Santeria religion.  Id. at 197-199.  The court held 
that the regulation violated the prisoners’ Free Exercise rights under both the RFRA compelling 
interest standard and the previous Turner reasonableness standard.  Id. at 205-212. 
Moreover, legislative history reveals that Congress intended RFRA to supersede the Turner/O’Lone 
standard.  H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 7-8 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-1901; Cooper, supra note 42, at 332. 
 44. William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 391, 392 (1998); See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a)-
(b) (1994). 
 45. See, e.g., Braunstein, supra note 12, at 2361-2362. The compelling interest standard often 
proved too difficult a standard for prison administration to overcome. See, e.g., id. at 2362.  But see 
Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
565, 569-70 (1999) (contending that for the four years that RFRA was the law, it proved deeply 
disappointing and accomplished very little). 
 46. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 47. Id. at 536.  In City of Boerne, Bishop Flores applied for a city building permit in order to 
enlarge the Saint Peter Catholic Church, which was built in 1923.  Id. at 511-12.  The city denied 
the permit pursuant to an ordinance that protected historic landmarks.  Id.  Based on the RFRA, the 
church challenged the city’s denial.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 523.  “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5.  The Supreme Court held that legislation 
which alters the Free Exercise Clause’s meaning is not enforcing the Clause.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
519.  The Court further stated that Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing 
what the right is.  Id.  The Court said that the Enforcement Clause provides Congress with remedial 
and preventive powers rather than substantive powers.  Id. at 519-520.  Moreover, the Boerne Court 
held that the RFRA was not remedial or preventive in its nature, because the legislative records 
lacked “examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious 
bigotry.”  Id. at 530. The Court stated that the RFRA is “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial 
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”  Id. at 532. 
 49. Buss, supra note 44, at 393.  When the Court fails to recognize a prisoner’s strong interest 
in religious exercise, the Court sends a message to society that religious freedom is not a 
fundamental human right; but rather it is a state created policy that the state can extend to and 
withdraw from people as it wishes.  Cf. Boothby, supra note 42, at 603. Buss stated that the Boerne 
8
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generally, lost the right to rely on the sweeping protection of a federal 
statute.50  The Supreme Court’s decision in Boerne has returned 
prisoners’ Free Exercise claims to the low-level standard of Turner.51 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of Facts 
Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI) is a maximum-security 
institution in Wisconsin.52 
Each of the Plaintiffs has at one time been housed in the adjustment 
center (AC) at WCI.53  Before entering the AC, property officers search 
all of an inmate’s personal property.54  While in the AC, the prison 
administration allows inmates to possess three state-issued books, and a 
“Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious book” from their personal 
property.55  Other than the “Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious 
                                                          
decision means that the Smith precedent would control again; therefore, Free Exercise claims would 
be recognized only if government action specifically targets religious practices for adverse 
treatment.  Buss, supra note 44, at 393.  However, after the Boerne decision, most courts have 
applied the Turner standard instead of the Smith precedent.  See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 
736 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the decision in Boerne restores the reasonableness test of Turner to 
Free Exercise cases); Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-72 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding 
that because the RFRA was overruled in Boerne, the appropriate standard to evaluate Free Exercise 
claims is the reasonableness standard used in Turner); Africa v. Horn, 701 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1997) (finding that the compelling interest standards set forth in the RFRA no longer 
apply, and choosing to use the Turner reasonableness standard).  Buss also argued that the Boerne 
decision will curtail Congress’ ability to enhance any constitutional rights guaranteed by the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Buss, supra note 44, at 393. 
 50. Buss, supra note 44, at 393. 
 51. See, e.g., Braunstein, supra note 12, at 2367.  While the Turner standard was largely 
unused during the three years that the RFRA controlled, courts resorted to the standard after the 
Boerne decision.  Id.  Some commentators have argued that Turner “is, and will no doubt remain, 
the law” unless state legislatures enact their own versions of the RFRA. See Boothby, supra note 42, 
at 584. 
 52. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *1.  The institution houses approximately 1,175 inmates.  Id. 
 53. Id.  The prison houses inmates in the AC for violating disciplinary rules and for temporary 
lock-up pending an investigation of a disciplinary rule violation.  Id.  The AC houses sixty-five 
inmates.  Id.  The usual length of time spent in the AC is less than thirty days; however, the 
segregation can be for a much longer period of time if the inmate violates disciplinary rules while in 
the AC.  Id.  Larry Fuchs, the supervising officer of the AC, stated that inmates housed in the AC 
have demonstrated, through their behavior, that they are dangerous and present a threat to the 
security of the institution.  Affidavit of Larry Fuchs at 4, Kirsch v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 
No. 95-CV-2867, (Wis., Dane County Cir., Branch 7, 1998) No. 95-CV-2867.  The officer further 
stated that limitations on AC inmates’ activities and property are necessary because the inmates 
present threats to institution safety, security, and discipline.  Id. 
 54. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *1. 
 55. Id.  The inmates may select the three state-issued books from the AC supply, which is a 
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book[s],” AC inmates may not possess religious materials such as 
interpretative or study books from their personal property.56 
B.  Procedural History 
The Plaintiffs, inmates at the time of the action, filed a complaint 
claiming that the prison regulation violated their First Amendment right 
of Free Exercise of religion.57  Specifically, the inmates cited the fact 
that the regulation prohibited them from possessing religious material 
(other than the “Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious book”) from their 
personal property.58  The prison administration defended the regulation 
by stating that it: 1) reduced the need for property officers to search 
inmate property,59 2) limited the amount of combustibles,60 and 3) 
reduced the occasion for contraband.61  The trial court entered a 
permanent injunction directing that each of the plaintiffs, when held in 
the AC, may possess in his cell a total of four books of his own 
choosing.62 
                                                          
collection of 100-150 paperbacks.  Id.  These books are generally fiction material.  Id.  The WCI 
librarian obtains these books at used book sales.  Id.  In addition to the AC paperback collection, the 
inmates can select up to five books from the library legal collection.  Id. at *2. Prison officials do 
not permit inmates to borrow books from the chapel library or the general library, except for legal 
materials.  Id. 
 56. Id. at *1. 
 57. Id. at *3. 
 58. Id. at *3. 
 59. Id. at *1-*2.  Property officers search the inmates’ personal property and place any 
prohibited items in a property room separated from the inmates.  Id. at *1.  The prison 
administration argued that allowing more personal property into the AC would increase the burdens 
on property officers.  Id. at *2.  The prison administration further stated that the searches do not 
entirely control the risk of contraband being introduced into the AC.  Id. at *7.  According to the 
prison, a strict limit on the number of personal items an inmate can bring into the AC makes 
searching property for contraband easier.  Id. at *2. 
 60. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *2.  The prison argued that the regulation was important in 
order to limit the inmates’ access to paper combustibles.  Id.  Inmates, in the past, had started fires 
in the AC.  Id. 
 61. Id. at *2.  The prison administration pointed to three occasions where a fire started 
because of a concealed match in the binding of a book.  Id.  The prison administration stated that 
limiting the amount of personal property to the “Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious book” 
decreased the amount of contraband introduced into the AC.  Id. 
 62. Id. at *1.  The trial court stated that the prisoners could choose four books, one of which 
could be a hardback, from either the inmate’s personal property or the AC’s supply of paperback 
books.  Id.  Before reaching this conclusion, the trial court first found that the prison could 
constitutionally limit the number of books to four.  Id. at *3.  The trial court agreed with the prison 
administration that the limits on the type and total amount of property allowed in the AC logically 
advanced the goals of safety and security.  Id.  The court found that such limits do protect against 
the risk of fire, clogged plumbing, and the security risk of blocked windows.  Id. 
However, the trial court concluded that the further regulation, which limited inmates to possession 
10
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The court of appeals applied the Turner factors63 in analyzing 
whether the regulation violated the prisoners’ Free Exercise rights.64  
Under the first factor, the court found that there was a valid and rational 
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate government 
interest of security.65 The court went on to find that the prison regulation 
satisfied the second factor,66 because the opportunity to use the AC 
supply books qualified as alternative means for prisoners to exercise 
their rights.67 After analyzing the third Turner factor, the court found 
that permitting the plaintiffs to possess four books from their personal 
supply (while housed in the AC) would have a significant ripple effect 
on prison staff and other inmates.68 
Finally, the court examined the fourth factor of the Turner 
Standard.69  The court decided that the regulation, which limited inmates 
                                                          
of only one religious book from their personal property, was not reasonably related to institutional 
concerns of protecting against contraband.  Id. at *3.  The trial court determined that the regulation 
was invalid under the Turner test, because it was not reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.  Id.  In making that decision, the trial court analyzed the case under the four factors of the 
Turner standard.  Id. at *3. 
The trial court reasoned that prison officials already searched one book (the Bible, Koran, or 
equivalent religious book from an inmate’s personal collection) for contraband; therefore, searching 
three more personal books would not pose significantly more security problems or an 
administratively onerous task.  Id. at *3.  The trial court ordered that an inmate could choose up to 
four books from his personal supply only once; the inmates, while in the AC, could not thereafter 
exchange these chosen books for other books in their personal possession.  Id. 
 
 63. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. 
 64. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *4-*5. 
 65. Id.  The court of appeals reasoned that increasing the number of books allowed into the 
AC from an inmate’s personal possession also increases the chances that contraband will make its 
way into the AC.  Id. at *5.  The court stated that an inmate’s personal property was much more 
susceptible to contraband than books from the AC supply, because the AC books did not circulate 
throughout the prison.  Id.  Therefore, the court concluded that books from the AC supply do not 
present the same opportunity to introduce contraband.  Id. 
 66. Id. at *6.  This Turner factor considers whether there are alternative means available to 
the inmates, which would allow them to exercise their religious belief.  Id. 
 67. Id. at *6. The court of appeals decided that the AC supply of mostly fiction paperbacks, 
the legal materials, and the one “Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious book” were enough for an 
inmate to freely exercise his or her religion.  Id. 
 68. Id. at *7. The court of appeals stated that property searches cannot entirely control the risk 
of contraband being introduced into the AC.  Id.  The court found that allowing additional personal 
property would increase the risk of contraband such as matches being overlooked in a search.  Id.  
Contraband presents a danger to other inmates and staff.  Id. 
 69. Id. The court of appeals cited Turner in stating that the existence of easy and obvious 
alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable but is an “exaggerated response” 
to prison concerns.  Id. at *7 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)). 
The court of appeals specifically stated that this fourth factor is not a “least restrictive alternative” 
test, in which the prison officials would have to “set up and then shoot down” every conceivable 
alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.  Id. at *8 (quoting 
11
Rarric: Kirsch v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
RARRIC1.DOC 3/26/02  12:31 PM 
316 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
to possession of one book from their personal collection, was valid 
because an increase of three additional books from the inmate’s personal 
collection would not be a “de minimis cost” alternative.70 
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the regulation 
significantly restricted prisoners’ Free Exercise rights,71 it determined 
that this was “precisely the type of judgment on which courts are to 
defer to the prison officials.”72 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
While the Turner factors may have given the impression that 
prisoners’ Free Exercise challenges would be fairly considered, Kirsch 
reveals how the strong underlying principle of unwavering deference has 
overpowered all other considerations.73  This disturbingly excessive role 
of deference is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s ancient hands-off 
approach to prisoners’ complaints.74  Moreover, the Turner Standard’s 
                                                          
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91).  The court stated that in order for a claimant to show that the regulation 
fails this factor, the claimant would have to point to an alternative that accommodates the prisoner’s 
rights at de minimis cost.  Id. at *8. 
 70. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *8.  The court of appeals stated that the prison administration 
considered the risks of contraband when they decided to create the regulation.  Id. The prison 
administration believed that, even if they searched the personal property, increased personal 
property in the AC still increases the risk of the introduction of contraband.  Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  Therefore, in deferring to the judgment of prison officials, the court reversed the trial 
court decision and remanded with instructions. Id. at *9.  The trial court had previously entered an 
order of permanent injunctive relief that allowed inmates in the AC to choose how many of the four 
books would come from their personal collection.  Id. at *3.  The trial court stated that this method 
would meet security concerns without imposing an onerous burden on administration, because the 
prisoners could only choose the books from their personal collection at the time they were first 
placed in the AC.  Id.  The inmates would be prohibited from exchanging their personal books for 
other personal books while they were in segregation.  Id.  The court of appeals admitted that the trial 
court had made a genuine attempt to alleviate a significant restriction on the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights while still taking into account the interests asserted by the State.  Id. at *8.  
However, the court of appeals, in a decision that is reminiscent of the old hands-off doctrine, 
concluded that it would be better to defer to the prison administration’s judgment.  Id. 
 73. Dei, supra note 12, at 429 (arguing that “the excessive role of deference in the Turner 
Court’s reasonableness standard reduces the arguably intermediate standard of review to that of a 
rational relationship standard”); See infra Part IV. A.  The excessively deferential standard 
essentially validates officials’ actions based on assertions regarding possible administrative and 
security problems rather than on the basis of any proof that the regulations are necessary to further 
governmental interests.  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Turner/O’Lone reasonableness standard is “categorically deferential.”); 
Dei, supra note 12, at 432.  At the time of the Kirsch decision (after the Supreme Court had ruled 
the RFRA unconstitutional), Turner was the law of the land. Boothby, supra note 42, at 584. 
 74. Dei, supra note 12, at 429.  Prior to the 1960s, courts applied the hands-off doctrine. 
Jonathan R. Haden,  A Balk at Constitutional Protection for Pretrial Detainees, 48 UMKC L. REV. 
466, 466 (1980); See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the hands-off doctrine).  
12
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fourth factor denies prisoners’ meaningful judicial review.75 
A.  The Significance of Kirsch 
The Kirsch Court concluded “The question . . . , representing as it 
does a balance of a number of competing factors, seems to us precisely 
the type of judgment on which courts are to defer to the prison officials, 
so long as it is reasonable.”76 
The Turner Court determined that courts must balance four 
competing factors in order to determine if the prison officials were 
reasonable.77  In practice, however, courts like the Kirsch Court allow 
the prison officials, themselves, to balance the competing factors; 
arguing that this is “precisely the type of judgment on which courts are 
to defer to the prison officials.”78  When courts invariably defer to the 
prison officials’ own balancing of the four Turner factors (factors that 
were created in order to determine the reasonableness of those very 
officials)79 the result is merely a modern-day hands-off doctrine.80  
Prisoners’ Free Exercise complaints do not receive a meaningful review 
when courts allocate such extreme deference to the prison 
administration.81 
                                                          
In his dissent in O’Lone, Justice Brennan maintained that the Court’s objective in selecting a 
standard of review for inmates’ constitutional challenges was not, as the majority declared, “[t]o 
ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials.”  O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 356  
(quoting O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349).  Justice Brennan continued with his caution against such a 
strong deference to the judgment of prison officials: 
The Constitution was not adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency with which 
government officials conduct their affairs, nor as a blueprint for ensuring sufficient re- 
liance on administrative expertise.  Rather, it was meant to provide a bulwark against 
infringements that might otherwise be justified as necessary expedients of governing. . . 
While we must give due consideration to the needs of those in power, this Court’s role is 
to ensure that fundamental restraints on that power are enforced. 
Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 75. See infra Part IV B. 
 76. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *8. 
 77. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).  The Court reasoned that the “reasonably 
related to legitimate prison interests” test would allow courts to review the reasonableness of the 
regulation in a less intrusive way than when using a strict scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 89.  The Court 
then provided the four factors that courts must use to determine the reasonableness.  Id. at 89-91. 
 78. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *8. 
 79. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
 80. Dei, supra note 12, at 436 n.171 (citing Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: 
The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1, 20 (1978).  Dei found 
Berger’s argument relevant to Turner in that “the newhands-on-but-highly-deferential doctrine” 
fails to protect prisoners’ rights.  Id. 
 81. See Berger, supra note 80, at 20. “The Supreme Court’s effective stance has been not only 
a reluctance to reverse administrative decisions, but rather the grant of virtually unreviewable 
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This result is not due to a flaw in the reasoning of the Kirsch Court; 
rather, it is the natural result of the principle of extreme deference found 
within Turner.82 When courts use the Turner standard, prison regulations 
are sustained “whenever the imagination of the warden produces a 
plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a 
logical connection between that concern and the challenged 
regulation.”83 A standard that yields so greatly to a prison 
administration’s “imagination” is “virtually meaningless” and is 
inadequate to protect prisoners’ Free Exercise rights.84 
B.  A Criticism of Turner’s Fourth Factor 
Justice Brennan labeled the Turner/O’Lone reasonableness standard 
as “categorically deferential.”85  The extreme deference given to prison 
                                                          
discretion to correctional officials on questions involving the constitutional rights of inmates.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 82. A single reasonableness standard, like the one articulated in Turner, is inadequate to 
protect prisoners’ constitutional rights.  Dei, supra note 12, at 427.  Absent overwhelming evidence 
of its unreasonableness, a prison regulation will be sustained.  Id. 
 83. Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens offered some 
extreme examples of how far the “logical connection” between the regulation and the institutional 
concern can extend.  Id.  Justice Stevens pointed out that there would be a “logical connection” 
between the institutional concern for prison discipline and a regulation permitting the use of 
bullwhips on prisoners.  Id.  There would be a “logical connection” between the institutional 
concern for security and a regulation which would ban any and all inmate communications, because 
communications may lead to the arrangement of an escape.  Id.  Justice Stevens offered these 
examples to show the dangers in giving such strong deference to prison officials.  Hopefully, Justice 
Stevens’ extreme examples would be so shocking to a court, that it would refuse to defer to prison 
officials’ “balancing” of the factors in such cases. 
  However, some recent cases may demonstrate that Justice Stevens’ examples are not so 
“outlandish.”  For example, in Doty v. Lewis, the court held that a prisoner could not possess a cloth 
tapestry that depicted a “religious” symbol on it, due to security and safety concerns.  Doty v. 
Lewis, 995 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Ariz. 1998).  Prison officials stated that the regulation was 
necessary for security purposes, because the cloth tapestries could be patched together to make an 
officer’s uniform for the purpose of escaping.  Id.  This explanation can tell us one of two things: 
either Arizona police officers are in need of some nicer uniforms, or the prison administration just 
realizes that it can offer any reason at all for the regulation and it will be found valid. 
 84. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); See Dei, supra note 12, at 427. 
 85. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  In a 
powerful argument, Brennan explained the harm of applying the Turner standard: 
Prisoners are persons who most of us would rather not think about.  Banished from everyday sight, 
they exist in a shadow world that only dimly enters our awareness.  They are members 
of a “total institution” that controls their daily existence in a way that few of us can imagine . . . . 
It is thus easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate netherworld, driven by its own 
demands, ordered by its own customs, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw nec- essity.  
Nothing can change the fact, however, that the society that these prisoners inhabit is 
our own . . . .  When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim, they in-
voke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture.  Rather, they speak the language 
14
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officials results in a manipulated application of the Turner Standard 
because it allows courts to find a “reasonable security concern” based 
upon mere speculation.86  However, it is the Turner Standard’s fourth 
factor that proves to be an all-but-insurmountable obstacle for 
prisoners.87  The fourth prong of the Turner Standard was a half-hearted 
attempt by the Court to insure that a regulation is not an overly 
restrictive means of accomplishing the penological goal.88  The Turner 
Standard of scrutiny is “so meager and deferential” that it has revived 
the hands-off doctrine.89 
“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from 
the protections of the Constitution.”90  However, the walls are not the 
barriers preventing an inmate from exercising his/her First Amendment 
rights.  The true obstacle is the burden placed on inmates to prove that 
exercising their constitutional rights will not require any extra effort on 
the part of the prison administration.91  “Placing the burden on the 
inmates . . . virtually ensures their failure, especially since almost any 
change in the established method of operating to accommodate the right 
will be at some cost to governmental interests.”92 
                                                          
of the charger upon which all of us rely to hold official power accountable.  They ask us to 
acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must be restrained at least as diligently as power 
that acts in the sunlight. 
Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 86. Roth, supra note 29, at 686.  Each of the four Turner factors can be manipulated by giving 
deference to prison officials rather than requiring the officials to produce specific evidence to 
support the regulation.  Id. at 690 (arguing that the Turner Court’s application of the third factor 
shows that the standard is easily manipulated).  Rather than require specific evidence showing that 
problems would arise from correspondence between institutions, the Turner Court chose to defer to 
the expertise of the prison officials.  Id. 
 87. Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-
Off” Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 230 (1993). 
 88. Giles, supra note 87, at 230.  Consequently, it is rare for a court to acknowledge that an 
alternative is reasonable, and it is even more rare for the court to determine that the regulation is 
unreasonable simply because a reasonable alternative exists.  Id. 
 89. Daniel J. Solove, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in 
the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 470 (1996). 
 90. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 91. See Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379 at *8 (stating that an inmate must find an alternative to the 
regulation that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to penological interests).  
Prison officials, not inmates, are in control of the evidence that is essential to show the superiority 
of a given deprivation over other alternatives.  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 359 
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 92. Dei, supra note 12, at 431. Inmates “have little chance of suggesting an alternative that 
could withstand the presumption of validity that accompanies a court’s deference to prison officials’ 
professional determination that the alternative would impose more than a de minimis cost.” Id. at 
431.  Virtually any accommodation of an inmate’s constitutional rights will have some effect upon 
the liberty and safety of other inmates and prison officials.  Id.  Once the change is shown to be at 
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A major problem with the fourth factor is that it undermines the 
little constitutional protection that the Turner Court likely intended.  
Presumably, the Court developed the standard as a method of 
determining when the exercise of a right is inconsistent with penological 
interests.93  However, the fourth factor unnecessarily undermines 
prisoners’ constitutional rights because it often denies rights even when 
they are consistent with the institution’s objectives.94  Even when 
prisoners can show that alternatives are available, the fourth factor 
simply states that this “may” be evidence that the regulation is 
overbroad.95 
Moreover, the Court failed to clarify what evidence the prisoners 
must produce in order to establish the existence of a de minimus 
alternative.96  Prisoners’ challenges are almost destined to fail because 
the Court has provided little guidance on what evidence the prisoners 
must provide. Consequently, courts are given too much latitude to 
uphold prison regulations that severely restrict prisoners’ Free Exercise 
rights—even when there are viable, less intrusive alternatives 
available.97  Without sufficient guidance, courts fail to seriously consider 
the proposed alternatives.  Instead, courts merely defer to the judgment 
of prison officials as to whether the alternative poses more than a de 
minimis cost.98  The fourth factor denies prisoners meaningful review. 
This fourth factor presented a barrier for the inmates in Kirsch.99  
The regulation permitted an inmate to possess only one religious book 
                                                          
some cost, in staff time, for example, it will defeat the de minimis requirement.  See id. at 436 
n.187. 
 93. See Giles, supra note 87, at 230. The Court stated that prison regulations will be upheld as 
long as they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
 94. See Giles, supra note 87, at 230.  “The discrepancy between the Court’s broad 
formulation [of prisoners’ constitutional rights] and the extent to which those retained rights may be 
exercised under the Turner test results from an incorrect formulation of the fourth prong of that 
test.”  Id. 
 95. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  Prison officials do not have to “set up and then shoot down” all 
conceivable alternatives. Id.  Rather the inmate must provide an alternative that fully accommodates 
his or her rights at a de minimis cost to penological interests.  Id. at 91. 
 96. Matthew P. Blischak, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners’ Religious 
Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 482 (1988). 
 97. Giles, supra note 87, at 230. 
 98. Blischak, supra note 96, at 482 (discussing how the O’Lone Court failed to probe into or 
assess the validity of the prison officials’ concerns about the prisoners’ proposed alternatives). 
Blischak argues that the O’Lone Court eliminated the requirement for any substantive scrutiny of 
prison officials’ purported concerns in response to inmates’ proposed alternatives.  Id.  Furthermore, 
the Court has provided unclear guidance for the lower courts regarding the appropriate degree of 
review of prison officials’ opinions.  Id. 
 99. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379, at *8 (holding that the alternative of permitting three 
paperbacks from an inmate’s personal collection would not be a de minimis cost). 
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from his personal collection.100  The inmates argued that they should be 
permitted to possess three additional books from their personal 
collection rather than from the AC’s limited library.101  The prison 
administration already searches the personal Bibles and Koran of the 
inmates, so a search of just three more books (such as religious study 
guides) would pose a relatively small additional cost.102  Moreover, the 
prison could reduce the risk of contraband by performing daily searches 
of the inmates’ living areas.  Although the request seemed to pose a very 
low risk to the penological interest of preventing contraband, the court of 
appeals deferred to the prison administration’s judgment that the request 
posed a greater than de minimis cost.103 
The inmates cannot argue that their alternative will have no effect 
on the current system.  There would be no reason for inmates to 
challenge any regulation if they did not want some form of change to 
occur as a result of that challenge.104  However, when an inmate’s 
challenge attempts to change a regulation, officials are confident that the 
prison can proffer some reason for the regulation and it will qualify as a 
“legitimate penological objective.”105 
Under the Turner Standard, inmates continue to be separated from 
the protections of the Constitution unless the requested right is so 
                                                          
 100. Id. at *1.  Property officers search this “Bible, Koran, or equivalent religious book” for 
contraband before it is allowed in the AC.  Id. 
 101. Id. (showing that the regulation allowed the AC inmate to possess four total books, only 
one of which could be from the inmate’s personal possession). 
 102. During the hands-off era, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a prisoner’s petition to receive 
Bible study guides.  Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir. 1944). The Kelly Court stated that 
prison officials were “vested with a rather wide discretion in safekeeping and securing prisoners 
committed to their custody.”  Id. at 83. 
 103. Kirsch, 2000 WL 730379, at *7.  Prison officials argued that an increase in personal 
possessions would lead to an increase in contraband.  Id.  Larry Fuchs, supervisor of the AC, 
testified that he knew of three occasions when matches were smuggled into the AC.  Id.  The court 
of appeals deferred to Fuchs’ belief that increasing personal property into the AC leads to an 
increased risk of contraband.  Id. at *8.  This type of deference has placed almost insurmountable 
obstacles in the way of Jewish inmates, for example, whose religious items are repeatedly 
confiscated by prison staff as “contraband.”  Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, How the Grinch Stole Chanukah, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1999). 
 104. Dei, supra note 12, at 431. A change in a prison regulation necessarily has an impact on 
the inmates and prison officials alike.  Id.  These changes will have an impact on staff time, 
inmates’ liberty, and even the safety of inmates and officers.  Id. 
 105. Jaroslawicz, supra note 103, at 720.  This confidence may be well grounded, because of 
the “categorically deferential” approach taken by the courts.  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The Turner Court’s open-ended “reasonableness” 
standard makes it  too easy to uphold regulations that restrict inmates’ First Amendment rights on 
the basis of administrative concerns and mere speculation about security risks; rather than on the 
basis of evidence showing that the restrictions are needed to further an important governmental 
interest.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 101 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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insignificant that it poses only a de minimis cost.106  If prisoners truly do 
have rights to the Free Exercise of religion in prison,107 then a less 
deferential, less hands-off approach by the courts is required.108  A better 
standard would obligate prison administrators to consider alternatives 
that are “less restrictive” than outright deprivations of constitutional 
rights, while still meeting institutional needs for safety and security.109 
C.  The “New RFRA”- It’s back, but for how long? 
A “better standard” arrived in the form of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.110  Congress may have lost a 
battle in City of Boerne,111 but it is still waging war over which standard 
to use in analyzing prisoners’ Free Exercise challenges.112  The 
                                                          
 106. See supra note 32 (discussing the de minimus element). 
 107. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 (1974)). 
 108. Haden, supra note 74, at 484 (arguing that a strong deferential approach allows the Court 
to “cleanse neatly its hands of the difficult task before it”).  Haden argued that Bell v. Wolfish, 
which, like Turner, applied a rational relationship standard and a deferential approach, resurrected 
the discredited hands-off doctrine and effectively ignored prisoners’ grievances.  Id.  Another 
problem with the deferential approach is that, in reality, the discretionary authority is not given to 
expert prison officials; rather, the true discretion rests in the hands of the cellblock guards who deal 
with the inmates on a personal, day-to-day basis.  Id. at 485.  “When the courts defer to 
administrative discretion, it is this guard to whom they delegate the final word on reasonable prison 
practices.”  Philip J. Hirschkop & Michael A. Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 
VA. L. REV. 795, 811-12 (1969). 
 109. Jaroslawicz, supra note 103, at 720 (describing the effectiveness of the RFRA 
“compelling interest” standard).  If nothing else, a “least restrictive alternative” test would force 
“prison officials to stop and think before simply denying requests for religious accommodation.” Id.  
“Bureaucratic inconvenience” is not sufficient to sustain a denial under the least restrictive test.  Id.  
Requiring prison officials to explore alternative means of providing religious accommodations (such 
as investigating how other prison systems have dealt with the situation) would not impose an undue 
burden on the state.  Boothby, supra note 42, at 584. 
 110. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (July 27, 2000). 
 111. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997). 
 112. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, at S7775-76 (July 27, 2000) (stating that the new bill applies the 
standard of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA): If government substantially burdens 
the exercise of religion, it must demonstrate that imposing that burden on the claimant serves a 
compelling interest by the least restrictive means).  146 CONG. REC. S7774, at S7775-76 (July 27, 
2000).  Congress cited several examples of prison regulations that discriminated against an inmate’s 
Free Exercise of religion. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, at S7775 (July 27, 2000). 
  A wide array of support has been displayed for the signing of the bill.  Teresa Malcolm, 
Bill Increases Protection for Religious Practice, NAT’L CATH. REP., Oct. 6, 2000, at 8.  The bill 
gained support from a vast coalition of religious groups, including evangelical Christians, Jews and 
Muslims.  Id.  Moreover, in a rare display of agreement with religious groups, the American Civil 
Liberties Union also praised the passage and signing of the bill.  Id.  Terri Schroeder, of the ACLU, 
stated that religion has been unfairly targeted by government regulation across the country and that 
this bill will help to restore the balance between the needs of religion and the needs of the larger 
community.  Id. 
  But see Juan Otero, Congress Moves to Federalize Local Land Use Control; Measure 
18
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 
reinstates the RFRA’s compelling interest test113 in place of the 
“reasonableness” standard of Turner.114 
In contrast to the Turner Standard’s fourth factor, the RLUIPA 
requires the prison administration to show that the regulation is the least 
restrictive means of furthering the compelling penological interest.115  In 
Kirsch, the court of appeals declared that the prisoners have the burden 
of proving an “easy and obvious alternative” at de minimis cost to the 
institution.116  While it is difficult for prisoners to propose “easy and 
obvious alternatives” at de minimis cost, prisoners’ challenges will have 
a much better chance for success under the RLUIPA’s scrutiny. 
Under the RLUIPA, courts cannot simply defer to the prison 
officials’ judgment without scrutiny.  Prisoners’ Free Exercise claims 
will once again receive a meaningful review.  The prisoners, in Kirsch, 
likely would have succeeded under the RLUIPA, because there are less 
restrictive means of controlling the amount of contraband in prison.117 
Unfortunately, the RLUIPA, like its predecessor the RFRA, may 
                                                          
Passes Under Guise of ‘Religious Liberty,’ NATION’S CITIES WKLY., Aug. 7, 2000, Vol. 23, Issue 
31 (arguing that the law is too much of a federal interference with local governments’ authority in 
the areas of land use decision-making and jail operations).  Otero argued that imposing a tougher 
standard than the Turner reasonableness standard will greatly disturb the local authority’s 
autonomy.  Id. 
 113. Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 3, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (hereinafter RLUIPA).  The Act states that 
no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of persons residing in or 
confined to an institution, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the 
government meets the burden of demonstrating: 1) that the imposition of the burden is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2) that the imposition of the burden is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.  Id. 
  If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause and shows that the government has substantially burdened the exercise of 
religion, the government will then bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim.  Id. at 
§ 4.  However, at least one commentator has stated that this same “substantial burden” threshold 
resulted in an ineffective RFRA.  Lupu, supra note 45, at 570 (reporting that the state prevailed in 
eighty-five percent of all reported decisions under RFRA claims, and half of the RFRA defeats 
occurred at the threshold as a result of narrow judicial constructions of the “substantial burden” 
requirement). 
 114. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 115. RLUIPA at § 3. 
 116. Kirsch,  2000 WL 730379, at *8.  Courts applying Turner’s fourth factor recognize that it 
does not require prison officials to prove that their policies are the least restrictive means of 
achieving their objectives.  Geoffrey S. Frankel, Untangling First Amendment Values: The 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1633-34 (1991). 
 117. Prison officials could spend the extra time searching the three additional books for 
contraband.  Moreover, prison officials could conduct daily or weekly searches of the AC inmates’ 
living quarters.  At the very least, the prison officials will have the difficult burden of proving that 
no less restrictive alternative exists. 
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not last long.118  Congress used its Spending Power and Commerce 
Power in an attempt to enact a constitutional version of the former 
RFRA. The Spending Power is quite solid,119 but the RLUIPA will not 
have as broad a coverage as the original RFRA when using the Spending 
Power alone.120  Following the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Lopez,121 
                                                          
 118. In enacting the RLUIPA, Congress needed to find some power, other than the Section 
Five power which was not enough in City of Boerne, that would allow it to set a new standard for 
reviewing prisoners’ Free Exercise challenges. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Court’s rationale for finding the RFRA unconstitutional).  In the RLUIPA, Congress 
hopes that their Commerce and Spending Powers will provide sufficient authority to enact this new 
version of the RFRA.  See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, at S7775 (July 27, 2000). 
  Through the Spending Power, Congress is attempting to enact the compelling interest test 
indirectly, by requiring that state agencies that receive federal funds not burden religion without a 
compelling reason. See Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom 
Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 715, 727 (1998). Under the Spending Clause of the 
Constitution, Congress is authorized “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and 
general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This power to spend implicitly 
includes the power to restrict the use of its appropriations and to impose conditions that recipients 
must honor if they choose to accept the federal funding.  Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional 
Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting 
Religious Freedom From State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 668 
(1998). 
  The application of the RLUIPA extends to any case in which the substantial burden on 
religious exercise is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.  
RLUIPA at  § 3.  The bill’s protections are confined to each federally assisted “program or activity,” 
which in most cases means the department that administers the institution in which the claimant is 
housed.  146 CONG. REC. S7774, at S7780 (July 27, 2000). 
 119. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom After Boerne, NEXUS, Fall 1997, Op. 91 at 96, 
available at LEXIS 2 NEXUS J. Op. 91, at *96 [hereinafter Religious Freedom].  The Supreme 
Court is unlikely to want to call into question what has been a central component of civil rights 
enforcement for many years.  Id. at *97.  There are only two significant limitations on the Spending 
Power: 1) the conditions on federal grants must be related to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs; and 2) the financial inducement by Congress can not be so coercive 
that a point is reached where pressure on the states turns into compulsion to accept.  South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987). 
  The Court, in Dole, showed that they will not forego all scrutiny of conditional spending, 
but the holding implies that this scrutiny will lead to invalidation, if at all, only in the most extreme 
cases.  Conkle, supra note 118, at 672.  However, the Court’s renewed concern for constitutional 
federalism may arise again in the form of a more inflexible “relatedness” requirement.  Id. at 675-
676 (noting that this may affect the Court’s willingness to accept a broad congressional definition of 
the scope of a state “program or activity” that would be subject to the conditions of the federal 
funding). 
 120. Conkle, supra note 118, at 673-80.  The Spending Power can only protect religious 
exercise when the burdensome state program is a recipient of federal funds.  Id.  Some states may 
specifically refuse federal funding in particular programs or activities in order to avoid the 
assumption of RLUIPA duties.  Id. at 682. 
 121. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 
1990, in which Congress made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”  
Id. at 551.  A twelfth grade student in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed, 
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many commentators believe that the Court would find RLUIPA-like 
legislation to be an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Power.122 
Real religious liberty for prisoners may depend on the Supreme 
Court’s own reexamination of the Turner standard.123  The dissenting 
opinions in City of Boerne indicated that while Congress may have 
exceeded its authority in enacting the RFRA, the current standards used 
by the Court still need to be reexamined.124 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Through Kirsch, we see how deferential the Turner standard has 
become.125  The Supreme Court declared that prison walls will not 
separate inmates from their rights of Free Exercise.126  In practice, 
                                                          
unloaded handgun and five bullets.  Id.  Federal agents charged the student with violating the Gun-
Free School Zones Act.  Id.  The Court held that the Act was an unconstitutional use of Congress’s 
Commerce Power, because Congress failed to demonstrate that the possession of guns in schools 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  Id. at 567.  The Court refused to “pile inference upon 
inference” in order to find a substantial affect.  Id. at 567.  This decision marked the first time in 
nearly sixty years that the Court invalidated congressional regulation under the Commerce Power.  
See, e.g., Molly E. Homan, United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Guns Down the Commerce 
Clause, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 237, 237 (1995). 
 122. Conkle, supra note 118, at 660.  The Lopez decision would invalidate such a law (as the 
RLUIPA) in many or most of its applications.  Id. at 658.  Moreover, such a law would probably 
violate state sovereignty as protected by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. United States.  
Id.  See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 160-61, 177-78 (1992) (finding that it is constitutionally 
troubling for Congress to address its legislation to state government alone, effectively requiring 
state and local bodies to govern in a particular manner). 
 123. Lupu, supra note 45, at 568.  Lupu suggests that legislation may actually hinder the 
religious liberty movement, because it will once again divert the Court’s attention away from Free 
Exercise adjudication.  Id. at 580.  The possibilities for new and creative approaches to Free 
Exercise adjudication are likely to shrink over time, because the sole focus will be on the 
controversial legislation (the RLUIPA).  Id. at 580.  Lupu believes that the better approach is to wait 
for attractive test cases and to make incremental gains through judicial results and well-crafted 
judicial opinions.  Id. at 593.  As the Boerne Court warned, “The power to interpret the Constitution 
in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 
(1997). 
 124. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Justice O’Connor maintained that “it is essential for the 
Court to reconsider its holding in Smith” because that holding did not “faithfully serve the purpose 
of the Constitution” in light of the historical record and the precedent of the Free Exercise Clause.  
Id. at 564-65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter also had doubts about the precedent set by 
Smith and wanted a full adversarial re-argument on the issue.  Id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer agreed that the case should have been set for re-argument to decide whether the 
Smith decision was correct.  Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
  Moreover, given the prevalent use of the Turner/O’Lone standards by the courts, the 
precedential value of these cases must also be reevaluated to ensure the premise that prisoners do 
possess Free Exercise rights.  Mayu Miyashita, City of Boerne v. Flores and its Impact on 
Prisoners’ Religious Freedom, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 519, 542 (1999). 
 125. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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however, the Court’s extremely deferential approach creates a very 
sturdy wall- one that separates too many inmates from their rights of 
Free Exercise.  Congress recently raised the level of tension and 
controversy when it enacted the RLUIPA.127  When the dust settles, the 
ultimate decision will once again be in the hands of the Supreme Court.  
Decisions concerning prisoners’ constitutional rights should always be in 
the hands of the courts . . . not the prison guards.  Therefore, the Court 
must overrule Turner and the modern-day hands-off doctrine. 
Owen Rarric 
                                                          
 127. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
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